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In Johnson v. Cochran- the Supreme Court, obviously perturbed
by the growing number of petitions for habeas corpus grounded on
inadequate parental notice, served notice to the legislature that the
statute should be more precise. No legislative action has been taken,
and the Court in its latest opinion dealing with improper notice3took matters into its own hands and urged each trial court to adopt
standardized procedures wherein timely notice would automatically
be given. The Court stated that if there is the slightest doubt concerning the status of the minor, notice should be given. Further, the
fact that notice has been given should always be included in the
trial court's minutes, a practice that is not widespread at present.
Until these remedial procedures are adopted, the habeas corpus
epidemic will continue to plague the courts.
LAWRENCE W.

RADAK

CRIMINAL LAWS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS
The Florida legislature has often passed statutes empowering
administrative agencies and political subdivisions of the state to
provide such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the regulation of a specified activity.' The empowering legislation makes
violation of these rules a crime punishable under the general statute
prescribing penalties for the commission of a crime. This legislative
technique has been used to implement many regulatory statutes
covering subjects varying from game laws to licensing of peddlers and
solicitors.' The empowered body is given authority to specify the
actions that constitute the crime generally described in the basic
statute.
This method of enacting criminal laws raises questions as to
proper delegation of legislative powers and compliance with the
requirements of due process. An empowering statute prohibits the
violation of certain rules or regulations but does not refer to specific
acts. When these rules and regulations are not adequately published, there may not be sufficient notice to comply with the hazy
and fenceless requirements of due process of law.
31. 124 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1960).
32. Willis v. Cochran, 127 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1961).
1. See, e.g., Fla. Spec. Acts. 1955, ch. 30550.
2. FLA. STAT. ch. 372 (1959).
3. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-1441.
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ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Properand ImproperDelegationsof Legislative Powers
The principle that one department or branch of the government
cannot delegate its powers to another branch is based on the Florida
constitutional provision for separation of powers.4 Any attempt by
the legislature to surrender its power is unconstitutional and hence
null and void.5 However, not all legislative powers are non-delegable.
The power to legislate is the power to create policy,- and this
power cannot be granted by the legislature to an administrative body. 8
This does not mean that an administrative agency cannot make valid
rules and regulations, penalties for the violation of which are provided by general statute.
In an early case 9 the Florida Supreme Court held that the legislature can enact a statute outlining a general scheme or policy and
conferring upon administrative officials the authority to make rules
and regulations that carry out the general legislative purpose. The
Court reasoned that the power to make rules is not the power to
legislate, because there is no determination of what the law shall be
and there is no exercise of independent discretion. This seems to
be the law in Florida today,o but "independent discretion" and
"rule-making power" are not yet adequately defined.
In Pridgen v. Sweat" the Court held that the State Board of
Dental Examiners had been given too much discretion by a statute
providing that an applicant shall be examined in "such subjects as
are taught in accredited dental schools, and any other subjects which
in the discretion of the Board are necessary."' 2 The Court found that
these provisions were too vague and general and that the statute was
not complete because it did not sufficiently limit the discretion of
the administrative agency.
Although the Pridgencase indicates that the Court zealously guards
against the delegation of legislative powers, a later case, State ex rel.
Lichtenstein v. Coleman, 3 reveals judicial recognition of the prac4. FLA. CONsT. art. II.
5. Pursley v. City of Ft. Myers, 87 Fla. 428, 100 So. 366 (1924).
6. State v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 80 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1955).
7. State ex rel. Palm Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v. Florida State Racing Comm'n,
158 Fla. 335, 343, 28 So. 2d 330, 334 (1946).
8. Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337, 82 So. 789 (1919).
9. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
10. Stewart v. Stone, 130 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1961).
11. 125 Fla. 598, 170 So. 653 (1936).
12. Id. at 601, 170 So. at 654.
13. 134 Fla. 624, 183 So. 730 (1938).
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tical necessities involved in the operation of an administrative agency
acting under an empowering statute. In Lichtenstein the rule-making
agency was composed of persons having direct pecuniary interests in
enforcing the statute. The Court stated that even though violation
of rules and regulations of an administrative agency may be a crime
punishable by imprisonment, the crime "must be defined by competent, impartial authority in order to afford due process and equal
protection of the laws."'1 If definition of a crime by an administrative
agency is objectionable under all circumstances, the basis for the
Court's decision that the agency's acts were invalid could have been
that only the legislature can define a crime. In basing its decision
partially on questions of the competency and impartiality of the administrative agency the Court seemed to acknowledge the fact that
in making rules and regulations to carry out a general statutory
scheme an administrative agency must of necessity exercise some
degree of discretion in defining essential details. This analysis is
validated by the Court's decision in Richardson v. Baldwin," in which
it was held that the legislature cannot delegate unlimited discretion
in applying the law and that agencies can be authorized "within
defined limitations to prescribe rules and regulations for its enforcement."8

A modern state government cannot function efficiently without
administrative agencies that are vested with some degree of discretion
in promulgating rules and regulations. Recognition of the practical
fact that these regulations often determine what the law shall be
would not unnecessarily enhance the powers of rule-making agencies
but would strengthen the rights of individuals subject to regulation.
Notice of AdministrativeRules
Notice PrecedingEnactment. Notice of the intended enactment of
administrative rules should be provided so as to give affected persons
adequate opportunity to be heard. The laws pertaining to notice
preceding enactment of rules are not uniform. For example, section
350.26 of Florida Statutes 1959, which gives rule-making authority
to the Florida Railroad Commission, provides that "reasonable
notice" must be given to "all interested parties." No further guides
for pre-enactment notice are given by the statute. Section 601.12 of
Florida Statutes 1959 states that rules promulgated by the Florida
Citrus Commission must be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the affected area within ten days of final enactment.
14. Ibid.
15. 124 FIa. 233, 168 So. 255 (1936).
16. Id. at 235, 168 So. at 256.
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Notice is usually not required before rulings on procedural matters,
but this is not the case when substantive rights will be affected.- 7
The Florida Court has indicated that notice is required when the
public would be "vitally interested" in the rulings of administrative
boards. 18 Although the Court apparently has not discussed the requirement of notice to the public preceding the adoption of administrative rules bearing criminal penalties, it seems certain that these
rules are of vital interest to the public and that notice should be
mandatory.
The second section of the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act'- provides for notice thirty days before adoption or repeal of any
rule or amendment. Several states have enacted similar legislation,20
and the Florida legislature should consider taking this step.
Notice After Enactment. Until the decision in Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan2 1 in 1935, there was no system for the central collection
and recordation of administrative rules in the federal government
in spite of the vast array of federal administrative agencies. Neither
the trial court nor the parties involved in Panama Refining Co. were
aware of the existence of an amendment to a crucial rule. To avoid
other embarrassing situations of this nature, Congress immediately
passed a statute requiring the publication of administrative rules in
22
a central registry.
The state systems for recordation of rules are a patchwork of
differing requirements. Many states require that administrative rulings be filed in a central office, usually that of the secretary of state.23
24
A few states provide for periodic codification of administrative rules.
Section 120.10 of Florida Statutes 1959 requires every agency of the
state government authorized to enact and enforce rules and regulations to file a copy of these rules with the secretary of state. Administrative rules are not effective until fifteen days after filing22 and
17. Fuquay, Rule Making and Adjudication in Florida Administrative Law,
9 U. FLA. L. REV. 260 (1956).
18. Robbins v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 153 Fla. 822, 16 So. 2d 121 (1943).
19. THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
329-336 (1944).
20. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §41-1002 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. §60-1501
(1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. §15.042 (1945).
21. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
22. 70 Stat. 337 (1956), 44 U.S.C. §305 (1958), requiring publication in the
Federal Register of all matter having general applicability and legal effect or
prescribing penalties.
23. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. §41-1004 (1956); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §265 (SmithHurd 1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §60-1505 (1950); Wis. STAT. §227.023 (1959).
24. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. §41-1006 (1956); IND. ANN. STAT. §§60-1507-09 (1951);
Wis. STAT. §§35.93, 227.025 (1959).
25. FLA. STAT. §120.11 (1959).
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are not admissible in evidence until filed.2 Section 120.14 of Florida
Statutes 1959, which allows for emergency situations, provides that
under certain circumstances a rule becomes effective five days after
filing.
The situation in Florida would be further improved if there were
legislation requiring periodic publication of a codification of administrative rules.POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE

LegislativePowers of Local Governments
Section 165.19 of Florida Statutes 1959 empowers city and town
councils to pass all laws and ordinances necessary for the preservation
of peace and morals and to impose necessary penalties for violation
of these ordinances. By virtue of this statute, the general police
power of the state is expressly delegated to the councils. The Florida
Supreme Court has stated that by immemorial usage based on public
necessity the constitutional provision vesting legislative powers in
the Senate and House of Representatives impliedly forbids the delegation of legislative powers to any state officers, but "does not apply
to the powers that may be conferred upon municipalities for local
governmental purposes." 27 At common law the legislature could empower municipal governments to pass ordinances having the force
of law,28 and the provision of the Florida Constitution vesting legislative powers only in the legislature 2 9 does not negate the common
law doctrine.
As early as 1894, the Florida Court held that it is constitutional
for municipal governments to prohibit and to provide punishment
for criminal acts within the city limits, even when the acts are covered
by state criminal statutes. 30 The defendant can be prosecuted under
both state statute and local ordinance without violation of his right
against double jeopardy. The Court has taken the position that in
order to justify a judicial declaration that a statute is inoperative
because it exceeds the limitations on the delegation of legislative
authority, the assailant must show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the conferred authority belongs exclusively to the legislature. 3'
ConstitutionalProhibitionAgainst Special or Local CriminalLaws
A statute empowering a political subdivision of the state to make
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

FLA. STAT. §120.12 (1959).
City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769 (1914).
Ibid.
FLA. CoNST. art. III,§ 1.
Thiesen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894).
City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, supra note 27.
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rules and regulations is often a special or local law as distinguished
from a general law. A special or local law relates to particular political subdivisions, persons, or localities, or operates upon a special
class rather than on the public generally. 32 General laws can contain
classifications based upon differences that are inherent in or that are
peculiar or appropriate to a class. 33 The distinction between special
or local laws and general laws often turns on the hazy and ill-defined
question whether the classification is reasonable. When classification
as a general law is questioned, the assailant carries the burden of
proving it to be unreasonable. 34 The legislature is given wide discretion in making the classifications, and due deference is given to
legislative judgment.35
The Florida legislature cannot enact special or local laws for the
punishment of a crime; 36 but the Florida Supreme Court has held
that this does not prohibit special or local criminal laws that define
3
an offense if the penalty for violation is provided by general law. 7
Punishment Provided by General Statute
When the Florida Court invalidates one portion of a statute on
constitutional grounds, the remainder of the statute is valid if legislative intent has not been destroyed.38 In Snowden v. Brown 39 the
penal provisions of a local act conflicted with the constitutional rule
prohibiting special laws for the punishment of a crime and were declared invalid. Although no punishment could be meted out to the
defendant, the conviction was allowed to stand and the defendant
was released. The state argued that Chapter 5920 of the Florida
Laws of 1909 was applicable. This statute supplied the punishment
for misdemeanors when a penalty is not otherwise provided by statute.
The Court rejected this argument, stating that there was no showing
of legislative intent that Chapter 5920 should supersede the invalid
penalty provision of the local law.
In 1911 the legislature amended Chapter 5920 to read substantially as it does today in section 775.07 of Florida Statutes 1959:
"The punishment for commission of crimes other than
felonies in this state, when not otherwise provided by statute, or
...is ineffectual because of constitutional provisions, or because
32. Carter v. Norman, 38 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1948).
33. Sheldon v. Reeder, 121 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1960).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. FLA. CONsr. art. III, §20.
37. Beasley v. Cahoon, 109 Fla. 106, 147 So. 288 (1933).
38. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908).
39. 60 Fla. 212, 53 So. 548 (1910).
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the same is otherwise illegal or void, shall be a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding ninety
days .... "
Two years after the Snowden decision, when a defendant was
convicted under the same local law, the trial court passed sentence
under the provisions of the amended statute. The Florida Supreme
Court upheld this action.40
A 1954 case, Taulty v. Hobby,4' concerned a special act regulating
the sale of alcoholic beverages in Seminole County and providing
a penalty for violation. The Florida Supreme Court struck down
the penalty clause because it violated the constitutional prohibition.
Stating that section 775.07 of the Florida statutes cannot be called
into operation for a special act unless the act specifically describes
the prohibited conduct as unlawful or as a misdemeanor, the Court refused to apply the statute to the beverage act because without a
penalty clause the act failed to define a punishable offense. When the
conduct is described as unlawful, section 775.07 will not be applicable
if the court finds that the legislative intent was to describe conduct
that is wrong but does not amount to a crime. 4 2 Thus, if the legislature declares by special or local act that certain conduct is a crime,
it can be punished under the statute; but if the conduct is declared
only unlawful, a question of legislative intent is raised.
Notice of Rules Enacted by PoliticalSubdivisions
Florida has constitutional 43 and statutory44 provisions requiring
notice of the passage of special or local laws, but these provisions do
not extend to the rules and regulations enacted by a political subdivision of the state under the authority of special or local acts.
Section 165.20 of Florida Statutes 1959 states:
"The city or town council . . . shall promulgate, without

unnecessary delay, all laws and ordinances which they may
enact by posting at the door of the city or town hall, and at
one other public place within municipality, or by publishing
the same in any newspaper in said city or town, in either case
for a period of not less than four weeks."
40. Stinson v. State, 63 Fla. 42, 58 So. 722 (1912); accord, Bell v. Vaughn,
155 Fla. 551, 21 So. 2d 31 (1945); Ex parte Brandamour, 91 Fla. 889, 108 So.
895 (1926); Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533 (1917).
41. 71 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1954).
42. Ibid.
43. FLA. CONST. art. III, §21.
44. FLA. STAT. §11.02 (1959).
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This statute, originally passed in 1896, is plainly obsolete. Posting
on the city hall door is hardly a satisfactory method of publication
in modern cities. The statute should be redrafted to require publication of notice in a local newspaper.
In an early case, the Florida Supreme Court appeared to treat the
notification statute as directory by stating, "It does not appear . . .
that the alleged failure to publish the ordinance for four consecutive
45
weeks after its passage would affect the validity of the ordinance."
The decision does not specify whether these words apply to complete
failure to publish or failure to publish for the full four weeks. It
seems reasonable that if any part of the statute is directory rather
than mandatory it must be the "four consecutive weeks" requirement,
because the statute would otherwise be useless.
In Adams v. Isler,4" a 1931 case, the city had passed two ordinances
regulating auctions, apparently for the purpose of restricting the
activities of the defendant, who was arrested four hours later. The
city charter allowed for the passage of emergency ordinances with
immediate effect, but another provision of the charter required that
every ordinance of a general and permanent nature be published in
a local newspaper within ten days after passage. The Florida Supreme
Court held that the auction ordinances were of a general and permanent character and a highly penal nature, and that they were not
enforceable without the required ten-day notice. The Court did not
refer to section 165.20 but based its decision on the city charter
provisions. The decision therefore raises the possibility that notice
of a penal ordinance is not mandatory unless notice is required by
the city charter.
Notice Requirements for County Officials. The Florida Constitution provides that "all county officers shall hold their respective
offices, and keep their official books and records at the county
seats .. . ."4 Florida statutes require boards of county commissioners
to keep itemized statements of expenditures, 48 books of account, and
minutes of their proceedings49 open for inspection. The Florida
Supreme Court has held that these constitutional and statutory provisions require that official meetings for the transaction of business
by boards of county commissioners must be conducted publicly at a
known place in the county, and that while commissioners may meet
in places other than the county seat for purposes of investigation
and discussion, official action involving public rights must be taken in
45. Gainesville Gas & Elec. Power Co. v. City of Gainesville, 63 Fla. 425, 429,
58 So. 785, 786 (1912).
46. 101 Fla. 457, 134 So. 535 (1931).
47. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §4.

48.
49.

FLA. STAT. §125.13
FLA. STAT. §125.11

(1959).
(1959).
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the county seat in a place open to the public.50 These rules permitting attendance at commission meetings and examination of the
minutes are of considerable value but are not complete protection
for the public. Counties are not required to give notice of meeting
dates, and the protective rules may therefore be averted. As a matter
of practice, however, notice is often given when controversial subjects are to be considered.
Failure of Notice as a Violation of Due Process. In Lambert v.
1
a 1957 case, the United States Supreme Court considered
California,5
a municipal ordinance that made it a criminal offense for a person
convicted of a crime punishable as a felony in California to remain
in the city for more than five days without registering with the chief
of police. Stating that due process of law requires notice, the Court
in a five-to-four decision reversed a conviction for violation of the
ordinance. The majority opinion indicated that when a person does
not know of the duty imposed upon him by a law, when there is no
proof of the probability of such knowledge, and when the conduct
is passive in nature and does not alert the defendant to the consequences of his deed, his conviction is a violation of the principle of
due process.
The Lambert case may have partially invalidated the generally
accepted doctrines that the law gives its own notice and that ignorance
of the law is no excuse. It now seems possible that ordinances such
as those requiring the registration of solicitors and peddlers may be
said to apply to passive conduct without vicious intent. If knowledge
of an ordinance cannot be shown, a conviction may fail for lack of
due process of law. Lambert could prove to be a caveat to states
that do not have an orderly system for publishing notice of the "laws"
of political subdivisions and administrative agencies.
The Burden of Proving Notice. In Town of Crystal River v.
Williams52 the Florida Supreme Court stated that when sufficient
evidence is introduced to show the passage of an ordinance, it will
be presumed that the city officers have performed all necessary duties
in conjunction with its passage and publication. In order to overcome this presumption, it must be affirmatively shown that there
was no publication.53 The assailant of an old ordinance on the basis
of lack of notice may find this burden of proof to be an impossible
requirement.
CONCLUSION

Frustrating problems are often presented to the public, the bar,
50.
51.
52.
53.

Motes v. Putnam County, 143 Fla. 134, 196 So. 465 (1940).
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
61 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1952).
Christie v. City of Lake City, 157 Fla. 335, 26 So. 2d 167 (1946).
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